PSP-ONE Discuss Private Health Sector A Live Interviews Online Site Powered by Forum One http://discuss.psp-one.com/ Thu, 18 Mar 2010 13:58:26 +0100 SyntaxCMS via FeedCreator 1.7.2 Contracting for Health Services http://discuss.psp-one.com/content/interview/detail/551/
Tricia Moser:

a. What capacities are needed in countries to manage the contracting process and contract oversight? Where should these capacities reside?

b. How are these capacities (needed to manage the contracting process and contract oversight) measured?

c. How can the capacities (needed to manage the contracting process and conduct oversight) be developed in countries that do not already have them?

Benjamin Loevinsohn:
a: There are a few different capacities that are needed:

(i) The procurement (or recruitment) of private sector services is a specialized skill but one that can be learned. Each financier, whether government, donor, other development partner, etc., has different rules that govern the procurement process and these need to be understood well. The contracting toolkit (available as a pdf file on this website) talks about some of the basics. My sense is that people tend to mystify procurement and make it more complicated than it should be. Don’t be intimidated!

(ii) Monitoring and evaluating private provider performance is really central to the success of contracting and requires a number of sources of information to be in place and the skilled people who can interpret the results. The sources of information include: (a) monitoring field visits; (b) HMIS; (c) health facility surveys; and (d) household surveys. These sources of information have to be used and there need to be discussions with contractors who are performing poorly.

(iii) Financial management and prompt disbursement. The payer needs to ensure prompt payment of the contractors (say NGOs) because delays can lead to gap in services. The contract management group needs to be able to understand the financial reports that contractors send them. However, it’s really important that, wherever possible, lump-sum contracts are used because otherwise contract management units can spend a huge amount of time focused on looking at inputs. Lump-sum contracts also maximize flexibility and innovation.

On the question of where these capacities should reside: There needs to be a unit that manages contracts that is properly staffed and supported. Whether this should be in the MOH or another part of the purchaser’s organization is hard to know. It does make sense to have third parties actually carrying out the health facility and household surveys to ensure independent and hopefully neutral assessment.

b: It’s difficult to measure these capacities really, but an important indicator is the promptness of payment to contractors.

c: Most countries have these skills, although they may not reside in the Ministry of Health or even in the government. They may require that (local) consultants are hired with special expertise in the three basic areas described above. There is also the opportunity to train the purchaser’s staff.

Overall, I would say that contract management is a challenging area that deserves considerable attention. However, it is not a show-stopper. Even in countries that managed contracts poorly, contractors, particularly NGOs, were still able to make progress. Also, the fact that even countries with little contracting capacity at the beginning, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, were able to develop these skills and do a reasonable job of contract management shows that it’s possible to do this in difficult circumstances.
Ann Canavan:

a. Cost effectiveness of contracting versus government provision of services: What are we counting in terms of the total cost of a resource package for basic health services? Are transaction costs justified in terms of scale up of contracting?

b. "Contracts may increase inequities in health service delivery” quote from Lancet; Buying results article (Loevinsohn, B. (2005) – what is the evidence to date on the issue of contracting and promoting access to healthcare; is there sufficient evidence to suggest that such an approach is successful in reaching the poor?

Benjamin Loevinsohn:
a: The issue of cost-effectiveness is clearly important and a little complex. However, in a number of cases, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, NGOs performed better than governments even when given the same budget or less. For example, in Pakistan the cost (to the government) per out-patient visit was 50% less in the contracted district than in the comparison government run area. The transaction costs are difficult to quantify for both the contracting approach and government delivery of services. Then we need to look at under-the-table and indirect costs which make things complicated.

In Cambodia, cost effectiveness depends on whose costs you look at. If all you care about is the government’s own expenditures then contracting was more expensive and may not have been cost effective. However, if you also look at out of pocket expenditures by the community, contracting becomes very cost effective, i.e. better performance at lower cost to the society.

b: On the issue of equity (something critics of contracting have often brought up): There is limited data but what data exists indicates that contractors will do a better job on equity particularly if it is included in the contract as part of the terms of reference. In Cambodia for example, contracting was much more equitable than government provision of services. So to in Bangladesh and both these contracts had explicit language about equity. In Pakistan, use of services by the poor was the same in the contracted district compared to government provided services. In the Pakistan case there was no mention of equity in the contracts.
Patricia Taylor:
How do the contracting-out models tried in Cambodia and Guatemala differ from each other and from those of the African governments that have been contracting with faith-based networks (i.e., DRC, Zambia) for the management and/or provision of health services?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
I don’t know the contents of the various contracts or agreements that African governments use with confessional NGOs or networks so I can’t comment in detail. From what I know the nature of the contracts certainly varies from country to country and has changed over time. My sense from the few that I’ve seen is that the contracts, or really agreements, focus more on resource transfers, financial accountability, and reporting, but I’m sure there are others that deal with other issues as well.

The fact that many African governments already have a long experience working with confessional NGOs suggests that there’s an opportunity to build on this experience to quickly strengthen service delivery.
Mr Oge Nkemakolam:
What are the mechanisms that could be put in place to ensure quality and timeliness of health services to be delivered through contracts?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
Addressing quality is really important and it should be clear in the contract which standards and guidelines the contractors need to adhere to. Measuring quality, both in the private sector (whether for profit or not-for-profit) and the public sector, requires health facility assessments (see task 10 page 40 of the contracting toolkit). These are technically challenging to design but are critically important and some examples already exist.
Rose Kumwenda-Ng'oma:

a) Has anyone been involved in contracting out essential health care services?

b) Could you please share with us your experience with service delivery contracts in terms of lessons and best practices?

Benjamin Loevinsohn:
a) There are now many examples people contracting out essential health care services. In Pakistan some 50 million people live in districts where publicly-financed primary health care services are managed by NGOs. In Afghanistan, 20 million people receive their primary health care by NGO delivered services.

b) In the contracting toolkit you’ll find some an example of a good contract on page 107 and some examples of terms of reference that you could include in a contract. You can use the checklist in the toolkit (on page 67) to look at existing contracts and see how they might be strengthened.
james sakwa:

a. Who financially supports pay for performance activities in developing countries besides community health insurance schemes?

b. What would be the outcome if pay for performance were integrated in to mainstream health care delivery in developing countries like Kenya that intend to provide free health services?

Benjamin Loevinsohn:
a) There are a number of governments, often with donor support, that finance P4P schemes. The World Bank is working with governments in 8 countries in Africa to test P4P.

b) It’s possible that it would help strengthen health service delivery. It’s an approach that should certainly be tested on a reasonable scale to see how well it works in the Kenyan context.
Dr Alex Hakuzimana:
Do you think paying for performance is sustainable? If not, what would you suggest to make paying for performance sustainable?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
Sustainability issues are always difficult to discuss and usually complex. The first issue regarding sustainability is whether the intervention or approach is worth sustaining, i.e. does it work? Is it more effective than other approaches? Sustaining failure is un-wise.

The next issue is whether the intervention is cost-effective than the alternatives but even here it is complex because if you’re reaching more remote communities or poorer people, you may be willing to support an intervention even if the costs per patient served are higher.

Sustainability often has to do with the resources that are available which is really a political question about the priorities of the government.

All told I don’t think we understand very much about the sustainability of P4P yet. Let’s first make sure that it works well in different contexts!!
Dr Alex Hakuzimana:
I worked with a pay-for-performance project in Rwanda for a period of about 2 years. In my experience, in addition to paying for performance, there are other components to take seriously into account - like quality assurance and capacity building. However, health care providers (in the era of money) tend to look at quantity of results equivalent to an amount of money and this may sideline client-centered satisfaction and benefits. How can we ensure that P4P is improving quality of care while incentives in terms of money are still provided?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
I know that in Rwanda, the quality of care was explicitly part of the P4P approach and I agree with you that it is critically important. It’s not helpful if providers focus on quantity of services and cut corners on quality.
woinshet mengesha:
How is it possible to contract services without a formal public-private partnership policy and given the scattered nature of the private sector?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
It's important to be clear about geographical responsibility of the private providers. If you use a competitive bidding process then you can assign responsibility. A completely different way of doing things is to just work with all existing private providers and pay on the basis of services provided. This admittedly is complicated.
Woinshet Nigatu:
When contracting-out service delivery to the private sector, how do you harmonize operations and management with the public sector?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
This is an important question. Again, geographical responsibility needs to be clear. However, there are different models of contracting, such as contracting in of management services that can be used in existing public systems. For a more detailed discussion of this issue you should see pages 12-15 of the contracting toolkit available on the website.
Dr Sade Solaja:
With the scattered nature of the private sector, how easy is it to contract services out?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
This is similar to a previous question. If the purchaser is clear about which geographical areas need to be covered, then the contracts can be be clear about the areas that need to be covered. In Africa, confessional NGOs may not want to cover areas where they are not currently working, but that can be overcome through negotiations and clear terms of reference.
Mr Oge Nkemakolam:
How does contracting for health services improve the quality of lives of those intended?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
I think so far the evidence indicates that contracting can improve the quantity of care that is delivered, even in very difficult circumstances. There is some evidence that contracting can imporve quality of care and also equity, i.e. that it is better at reaching poor people. This is especially true if the contracts specifically address issues of equity and quality of care in addition to the quantity of services provided.
barbara ohanlon:
What systems are needed in a Ministry of Health to design and monitor contracts for services?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
You may want to look at the answer I provided to Tricia Moser. Also see pages 52-55 of the contracting toolkit for more specific suggestions. Clearly there's a need for a diverse set of skills and it's more than just a part time job!!
Dr Maureen Martey:
a. What are good and bad contract management practices?

b. How can the health sector develop contracts that can be enforced and well monitored particularly in the clinical areas?

c. Are there best case examples of contracting out of clinical services to the private sector and how have these improved efficiency and effectiveness without undermining equity and the attainment of national goals?

d. Are there any triggers for contracting of health services? How does a national health system decide on contracting out of health services and then determine which services to contract out or not?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
These are lot of good questions:
a) I think the commonest mistakes in contract management are (i) not monitoring contractor performance adequately and (ii) not paying contractors in a timely fashion. However, I've seen a number of instances where these functions have been handled very well. For example, in Afghanistan the contract management unit really whipped some poor performing NGOs into shape and they dramatically improved their performance. This was done through field visits and extensive discussions with NGO managers.

b)Monitoring of contracts requires careful technical assessment. Sometimes it makes sense to use a third party expert.

c) If you mean contracting to individual private providers, there are many examples in OECD countries. There are fewer in developing countries but the work done on TB case management by private providers is potentially interesting.

d) Contracting should be considerred where public providers are not performing optimally. This may be particularly true for remote and under-served rural areas and poor urban ones.
cheikh mbengue:

a) We know the experience of Rwanda. But, are there other examples of contracting for health services in Africa that you think we should learn from? Particularly in West African countries?

b) What are the key differences between contracting-out for health services with non-profit entities and contracting-out for health services with for-profit providers?

Benjamin Loevinsohn:
a) There are actually a lot of examples in Africa, but unfortunately they have not often been written up and evaluated rigorously. There's a published article about nutrition services being contracted in Senegal (see page 156 of the contracting toolkit).

b) That's tough to answer but an important question. There's relatively little experience with contracting with for-profit providers. This is an area we will have to learn more about. Some cuation may be required because health service contracts, by their nature are not complete. On the other hand many OECD coutries use implicit contracts with for-profit providers all the time.
cheikh mbengue:
What are the advantages or disadvantages of moving from informal partnership arrangements to formal contracting arrangements between the MoH and for-profit providers? When would you recommend formalizing contracting arrangements?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
I think there are many advantages to having formal agreements. Of critical importance is: (i) agreeing on what the objectives are and how progress will be measured; (ii) the roles and responsibilities of both parties; and (iii) clear mechanisms for resolving disputes or differences. My sense is that formal contracts simply work better because both parties take them more seriously.
Allison Gamble Kelley:
For a variety of reasons, many Ministries of Health fall back on the old Memorandum of Understanding concept instead of fleshing out a contract with their private sector partners. Give us your best policy advice on how to tackle this "cultural preference" (as it was put at the Addis workshop) for MOUs.
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
I think that the word "contract" sometimes scares people off because it implies a commercial arrangement with for-prfit entities. I'm not sure that label really matters. What's important is that the agreement, contract or MOU contain the elements that are needed to achieve results. This is what the contracting toolkit is all about. Using the checklist on pages 66 and 67 will give a quick sense of whether the MOU, agreement, contract is addressing all the important issues.
Tricia Moser:
Is there evidence of cost-effectiveness for contracting essential services (e.g., does it cost less for outputs than traditionally delivered services)? If yes, what are the obstacles that may impede more countries from moving toward more contracting?
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
Below is the answer I provided to a previous question about cost-effectiveness. On the obstacles, I think there are many: (i) lack of familiarity with contracting, people are scared of what they don't know so well; (ii) some people in governments see contracting as an implicit insult, i.e., that they're doing a good job so why involve NGOs or others. Often this is a question of pointing out that private providers often have more flexibility and so can respond more easily becuase they don't face civil service rules and regulations; and (iii) some unscupulous people in governments see contracting as loosing power, prestige, or the opportunity to steal money. For a fuller treatment of this issue see pages 21-24 of the contracting toolkit.

The issue of cost-effectiveness is clearly important and a little complex. However, in a number of cases, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, NGOs performed better than governments even when given the same budget or less. For example, in Pakistan the cost (to the government) per out-patient visit was 50% less in the contracted district than in the comparison government run area. The transaction costs are difficult to quantify for both the contracting approach and government delivery of services. Then we need to look at under-the-table and indirect costs which make things complicated.

In Cambodia, cost effectiveness depends on whose costs you look at. If all you care about is the government’s own expenditures then contracting was more expensive and may not have been cost effective. However, if you also look at out of pocket expenditures by the community, contracting becomes very cost effective, i.e. better performance at lower cost to the society.
Aneesa Arur:
I want to thank all of the participants for their questions. I also want to thank Dr. Loevinsohn for his time and insightful responses. Clearly there is a lot of interest in the topic of contracting. You will be able to review the full transcripts on the Network for Africa workspace. Please recommend to your colleagues to log on to the workspace to see lots of materials on working with the private sector in health. We will have additional on line chats with experts so please suggest to use what techinical areas you are interested in and stay tuned for the next on line chat. Regards, Aneesa
Benjamin Loevinsohn:
Thanks Aneesa, this was lots of fun!!

Further Reading

Primer for Policymakers - Contracting-out Reproductive Health and Family Planning Services: Contracting Management and Operations
Download here (PDF, 306KB)

Loevinsohn, Benjamin. 2008. Performance-based contracting for health services in developing countries : a toolkit. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank.
Download here (PDF, 3.09MB)

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Benjamin Loevinsohn Thu, 02 Oct 2008 12:30:00 +0100